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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE
ASSOCIATION, AN ORGANIZATION'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE
WHAT NOT TO SAY
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000)
Elizabeth A. Powers*
The Boy Scouts of America expelled the respondent from his position
as an assistant scoutmaster for the Boy Scouts of America when the
organization learned that he was an avowed homosexual Respondent
filed suit against the petitioners alleging that his expulsion,2 which was
based solely upon his sexual orientation,3 violated New Jersey's public
accommodations statute.4 The trial court granted the petitioners' motion
for summary judgment, holding that the public accommodations statute
was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public
accommodation. 5 The New Jersey Superior Court's Appellate Division
reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further
proceedings, 6 holding that the Boy Scouts was a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of the New Jersey public
accommodations statute7 and that the petitioners had violated this statute.8
* To my parents, Agusta andRobert, and my sister, Thora, for their never-ending love and
support. And to my fianc6, Jose, for his boundless patience and inspiration. Your constant faith in
me helped to make this possible.
1. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446,2449 (2000). Respondent's expulsion was
based upon a newspaper article identifying the respondent as the co-president of the Rutgers
University Lesbian Gay Alliance. Id. at 2472-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 2449. Respondent requested three types of relief: a declaration that his rights had
been violated, reinstatement of his membership, and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at
2464 n.6.
3. Id. at 2449. Respondent received a letter informing him that his adult membership had
been revoked. Id. When he inquired into the reason for the revocation, he was informed that the
Boy Scouts forbid homosexuals from being members, Id.
4. Id. New Jersey's public accommodations statute forbids discrimination based on sexual
orientation in places of public accommodation. Id. at 2449-50 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4,
10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000)).
5. Id. at 2450.
6. Id.
7. Id. A number of other courts have ruled that the Boy Scouts are not a place of public
accommodation. Id. at 2456 n.3; see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the Boy Scouts are not a place of public accommodation for purposes of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the plain meaning of the statute excludes those
organizations that are not tied specifically to a physical location); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council
of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 236 (Cal. 1998) (holding that the Boy Scouts did not fall
under the "business establishment" language of Califomia's civil rights statute because the
language of that Act did not include social organizations such as the Boy Scouts); Quinnipiac
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the appellate court's ruling.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari," reversed the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision, and HELD that the application of New
Jersey's public accommodations statute, which required the petitioners to
admit the respondent, violated the petitioners' First Amendment right to
freedom of expressive association."
The freedom of expressive association has been recognized by the
Court as the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in activities
protected by the First Amendment, such as speech. 12 In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,3 the Court addressed the conflict between a state's
compelling interest in eliminating gender-based discrimination' 4 and the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expressive association. 5 The
Jaycees were an exclusively male, non-profit organization formed to
pursue educational and charitable purposes and to promote the growth of
young men's civic organizations. 6 The plaintiff argued that the exclusion
of women from the organization violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act
("Act"). 17 The defendant organization countered that the forced inclusion
of women by application of the Act would violate the male members'
freedom of association and freedom of speech.'"
The Court held that the Jaycees failed to show that application of the
Act imposed any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of
expressive association. 19 The Court concluded that the right of expressive
Council v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352,359 (Conn. 1987) (holding
that the anti-discrimination statute did not apply because the female denied membership was not
denied an "accommodation" as was required by the statute); Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council,
891 P.2d 385, 406 (Kan. 1995) (holding that the Boy Scouts were not a place of "public

accommodation" for purposes of the Kansas anti-discrimination statute because it was not a
business establishment).
8. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2450.
9. Ia.
10. Id. The Court granted certiorari in order to determine if the application of the New Jersey
public accommodations law violated the First Amendment. Id.
11. Id.at 2457.
12. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
13. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
14. Id. at 623. The Court recognized that Minnesota had a compelling interest in eliminating
gender-based discrimination. Id.; see alsoBd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537,
549 (1987) (holding that California had a compelling interest in eradicating gender-based
discrimination within the Rotary Club).
15. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
16. Id1
17. Id. at 614. The Minnesota Human Rights Act states that it is an unfair discriminatory
practice to deny any pdrson full enjoyment of the accommodations of a place of public
accommodation because of sex. Id. at 615.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 626.
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association was not absolute, and that infringement of that right could be
justified, as it was in Roberts, by regulations that serve compelling state
interests. 20 The court based its decision on the fact that application of the
Act would not require the Jaycees to change their creed or turn their focus
away from providing opportunities for young men.21 The Jaycees already
invited women to share in their views and philosophies and to participate
in many of their activities.'
In a subsequent case, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,23
the Court clarified the question of whether it is acceptable to deny a person
membership to a particular group. In that case, the New York State Club
Association filed suit against the city and some of its officers, seeking a
declaration that the New York Human Rights Law ("Law") was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment72 The plaintiffs claimed that
the Law infringed upon every club member's right of expressive
association by forcing the clubs to include members who did not share
their ideologies.26
The Court held that it is not acceptable to deny admission to an
individual based on specified characteristics, such as sex and race.27 In
finding that exclusion of prospective members based upon specified
characteristics violated the Law, the Court placed emphasis on the fact that
the Law did not require the clubs to accept everyone who sought
admission into the organization.2" Also important was the fact that the
record contained no evidence of the specific views held by any of the
clubs. 29 However, the Court also found that the exclusion of persons who

20. Id.at 623; see also Democratic Party ofUnited States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450

U.S. 107, 124 (1981) (holding that a court may not interfere with a group's First Amendment
protected expression simply because the court disagrees with that expression).
21. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.

22. Id. The Court focused on the fact that women were already admitted as members, just not
full voting members. Id. Consequently, the Court did not accept the argument that admitting women
to be full voting members would impair the Jaycees' ability to successfully advocate for the

interests of young men. Id.
23. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. at 7. The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in any place of
public accommodation. Id. The definition of"place of public accommodation" was broad enough
to cover places such as restaurants, which were at issue in this case. Id. at 4-5 (citing N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)).
26. Id.at 13.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Court concluded that "[i]f
a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share
the views that the club's members wish to promote, the Law erects no obstacle to this end." Id.

29. Id. at 14. The New York Court anticipated a scenario in which an organization might
conceivably be able "to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will
not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its
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do not share the clubs' views could be acceptable. 30 The Court stated that,
conceivably, there could be a case in which an organization might be able
to show that its ability to express a certain viewpoint would be hampered
by the forced inclusion of a certain type of member.3 '
The Court found the case that it had anticipated in New York32 in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston.33 In
Hurley, the Court held that Massachusetts could not require a private
parade to include a group of marchers who espoused a message that the
organizers did not wish to convey.34 The case involved a parade, organized
by private citizens, in which the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston ("GLIB") expressed an interest in marching as
a group, behind its own banner. 35 The Court held that the parade, although
organized by private citizens, fell under the definition of a "public
accommodation," as described in the Massachusetts statute. 3p The
petitioners argued that forced inclusion of GLIB would violate their right
to freedom of expressive association by forcing the petitioners to include
in their parade a message with which the petitioners did not agree.37
In deciding for the petitioners, the Hurley Court found that parades are
inherently expressive 3' and that, as such, the respondents' inclusion in the
parade would have signaled to onlookers that its message was worthy of
inclusion and support. 39 The Court emphasized that speakers have
autonomy to choose the content of their messages and that this autonomy
is protected by the First Amendment.4" In Hurley, the Court reiterated the
principle that those engaged in expressive association have the right to
choose what to say as well as what not to say.4 ' While the Court conceded
that the parade was not formed for the express purpose of opposing

membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion." Id. The Court
found, however, that this was not the type of case anticipated by that statement. Id.
30. Id. at 13; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
31. New York, 487 U.S. at 13.
32. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
33. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
34. Id. at 559.
35. Id. at 561.
36. Id. at 572. The Massachusetts public accommodations law prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in any place of public accommodation. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS
§ 272:98 (1992)).
37. ld. at 575.
38. Id. at 568. The Court emphasized that "parades are public dramas of social relations, and
in them performers define who can be asocial actor and what subjects and ideas were available for
communication and consideration." Id. (citing SuSAN G. DAVIS, PARADES AND POWERS: STREET
THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 6 (1986)).

39. ld. at 574.
40. Id. at 573.
41. Id.
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homosexuality, 42 it found that it was not necessary for a group to isolate
one specific message in order to be entitled to constitutional protection. 3
The Court found that regardless of their reason and regardless of the
Court's view of their position,' the petitioners were within their
constitutional rights to exclude a message with which they did not agree. 5
The instant Court applied the approach taken in Hurley by finding that
the respondent's presence in the Boy Scouts would force the organization
to communicate a message in which it did not believe. 46 The instant Court
stated that it was clear from a number of policy statements that the
petitioners did not support homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle
choice.47 To force the petitioners to accept the respondent, the Court held,
would violate the petitioners' freedom of expressive association.4"
In reaching its decision, the instant Court first considered the question
of whether the petitioners were engaged in expressive association. After
independently reviewing the factual record, the Court held that the
petitioners did engage in expressive conduct, as their mission was to instill
values in young people. The instant Court stressed the fact that
scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters were teaching young boys
-- expressly and by example-the views and morals held by the
organization.5 ' Since the petitioners were attempting to influence the boys
to believe in their moral codes, the Court found it indisputable that the
petitioners were engaged in expressive association.52

42. Id. at 560. The purpose of the parade was to celebrate Evacuation Day, the day that marks
the evacuation of royal troops and Loyalists from the city of Boston. Id.

43. Id. at 569-70.
44. Id. at 581. The Court refused to rule on the message conveyed by excluding GLIB. Id.
Instead, the Court said, "fo]ur holding today rests not on any particular view about the Council's
message but on the Nation's commitment to protect freedom of speech." Id.

45. Id. at 575.
46. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2454 (2000).
47. Id. at 2453. A 1978 position statement is the only one discussed by the Court that was
published before the respondent's expulsion. Id. It provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he Boy Scouts
[The Boy Scouts] do not believe that
of America is a private membership organization ....
homosexuality and leadership in'Scouting are appropriate." Id.(quoting the 1978 position statement
by the Boy Scouts).

48. Id. at 2457.
49. Id. at 2451.

50. Id. at 2452. The Boy Scouts' mission statement indicates that "[i]t is the mission of the
Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in young people." Id. at 2451
(quoting the Boy Scouts' mission statement).
51. Id. at 2452. In order to help instill values in young boys, the scout leaders spend time with
the boys camping, doing archery, or fishing. Id. The scoutmasters attempt to instill values in the
boys by providing a positive example and by engaging them in what they consider to be worthwhile

pastimes. Id.
52. Id.
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The second part of the instant Court's analysis focused on whether the
forced inclusion of the respondent would significantly affect the
petitioners' ability to advocate its public or private viewpoints.53 The Court
deferred to the petitioners' assertions that they were against
homosexuality 54 and held that the inclusion of the respondent would
hamper the petitioners' ability to express their views against
homosexuality. 5 In finding in favor of the petitioners, the Court relied
upon Hurley. 6 The Court held that the presence of an avowed homosexual
and gay rights advocate5 7 in a Boy Scout uniform would send a message
that the petitioners were, at the very least, accepting of homosexuality.58
The final part of the instant Court's analysis focused on whether the
application of New Jersey's public accommodations law,59 which required
the petitioners to extend membership to the respondent, would infringe
upon the petitioners' First Amendment right to freedom of expressive
association. 60Answering in the affirmative, the instant Court stressed that
the state interests furthered by New Jersey's public accommodations law
do not justify forcing the petitioners to communicate a position that is
completely contrary to their views. 6 ' The Court explained that the state has
an interest in eliminating discrimination, but not at the cost of another
group's constitutional rights.62

53. Id.
54. Id. at 2453. The Court stated that "as we give deference to an association's assertions
regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association's view of what
would impair its expression." Id. (citing Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981)).
55. Id. at 2455.
56. Id. at 2454. The Court found that:
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's... parade would have interfered with the
parade organizers' choice not to propound a particularpoint of view, the presence
of [respondent] as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the
[petitioners'] choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.
Id.
57. Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Not only was the respondent an avowed homosexual,
but he was also the co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian Gay Alliance. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
58. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2473.
59. The New Jersey public accommodations law provides that "[a]ll persons shall have the
opportunity to obtain... all ... the privileges of any place of public accommodation.., without
discrimination because of... sexual orientation." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2000).
"Place of public accommodation" is defined to include any "summer camp, day camp ... whether
for... accommodation of those seeking health, recreation, or rest." Id. § 10:5-5.
60. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455.
61. Id.at2457.
62. Id. at 2456.
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The dissent agreed with the majority's structure of analysis, but
disagreed with the majority's ultimate finding that inclusion of the
respondent would significantly impair the petitioners' ability to advocate
the viewpoint that homosexuality is not acceptable. 63 As the Court did in
New York,' the dissent recognized that a situation might arise in which
forcing a group to include a certain member would hamper the group's
right to freedom of expressive association.6 5 However, unlike the majority,
the dissent did not feel that the instant case was such a situation.66 What
was lacking in the instant case, according to the dissent, was any real
evidence that the petitioners had a public policy against homosexuality.67
In addition, the dissent stressed the lack of any clear indication that the
respondent so epitomized the acceptance of homosexuality that his
presence alone would make it impossible for the petitioners to advocate an
opposite viewpoint.68
The instant Court took the position that exclusion of the respondent
was acceptable by virtue of the fact that his inclusion in the Boy Scouts
sent the message to the public that the petitioners accepted homosexuality
as a lifestyle.69 In arriving at this decision, the instant Court relied a great
deal on Hurley.7" As in Hurley, the question here is not whether the Court
agrees with the message advocated by the petitioners, but whether the
petitioners have a constitutionally-protected right to choose which message
they send to the public.7" The Court's proper role is to rule on the law and
the Constitution and not to pass judgment on an organization's

63. Id. at 2470 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
64. New York, 487 U.S. at 1.
65. Id. at 2471 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized that "there are instances in
which an organization truly aims to foster a belief at odds with the purposes of a State's
antidiscrimination laws and will have a First Amendment right to association that precludes forced
compliance with those laws." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent found that this was not an example of a case as
was anticipated in New York. See id. (Stevens, I., dissenting); see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text. To the contrary, the dissent argued that this case was nothing more than an
example of an organization adopting an exclusionary membership policy, for which, the dissent
contended, there should be no protection. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued, in part, that the 1978 memorandum was
not indicative of any policy toward homosexuality because the memorandum was never distributed
publicly. Id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that "[t)he notion that an
organization of that size ... implicitly endorses the views that each of those adults may express in
a non-Scouting context is simply mind boggling." Id. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2454.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 2458.
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viewpoints.7 2 The purpose of the First Amendment is to protect speech,
regardless of message popularity.73
In essence, the dissent was asking the Court to find that the petitioners
did not have the right to denounce homosexuality.74 However, in order to
find that the petitioners did not have the right to exclude the respondent,
the Court would have been forced to implicitly rule on the validity of the
petitioners' message. Had it found as the dissent urged, the Court would
have communicated that the state interest in protecting homosexuals
outweighed the petitioners' right to freedom of expressive association.75
While it has been recognized that states have a compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination, 76 previous case law indicates that this
compelling interest cannot impose serious burdens on the freedom of
expressive association."7
In reaching its conclusion in the instant case, the Court found that the
application of New Jersey's anti-discrimination statute would have
imposed a serious burden on the petitioners' right to expressive
association.78 Simply because the petitioners did not publicly denounce
homosexuality does not mean that they should be forced to communicate
the message that homosexuality is acceptable. 79 The Court encountered the

72. Id. The Court emphasized that it was not proper for the Court to be "guided by [its] views
of whether the Boy Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong." Id.
73. Id.
dissenting). The dissent talked at length about the history of
74. See id. at 2478 (Stevens, J.,
prejudice against homosexuals. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent ended its argument with
the observation that "harm [caused by past and present prejudice] can only be aggravated by the
creation of a constitutional shield for a policy that is itself the product of a habitual way of thinking
about strangers." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See i.at 2456. The Court pointed out that in freedom of association cases, as in the
instant case, the freedom of expression is weighed against the State's interest. Id.; see also New
York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (holding that New York's
interest in eradicating discrimination prevented an organization from using specified characteristics
to deny membership); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987)
(holding that slight infringement on Rotary Club members' freedom of expressive association was
constitutional in light of California's interest in eliminating gender-based discrimination); Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (holding that even if enforcement of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act caused some small abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech, the
State had a greater interest in eradicating gender-based discrimination).
76. See supra text accompanying note 14.
77. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456; see also Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548 (holding that California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act did not violate Rotary Club members' right to freedom of association since
application of the Act did not "affect in any significant way the existing members' ability to carry
out their various purposes"); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (holding that the enforcement of the
Minnesota Human Rights Law was not unconstitutional because it did not impose "any serious
burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association").
78. Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2457.
79. See id. at 2455. The Court found that "(t]he fact that the organization does not trumpet
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same issue in Hurley, where it ruled that the fact that the parade was not
organized specifically to denounce homosexuality did not mean that the
organizers were not entitled to protection under the First Amendment."
Similarly, in the instant case the fact that the petitioners did not form for
the sole purpose of denouncing homosexuality should not deprive them of
their First Amendment protections. 8'
In analyzing whether a group should be required to include a certain
message, the expressive rights of the organization must be weighed against
the state's interest.8 In Roberts, the Court held that the Jaycees were not
permitted to exclude women because the inclusion of women would not
have required the organization to change its creed or philosophy.3 In the
instant case, however, forced inclusion of avowed homosexuals would
have forced the petitioners to alter the philosophy of the organization since
the organization did not support homosexuality.84 The Court found ample
evidence to support the idea that the petitioners' organization tries to instill
values in young people.8 5 Moreover, the values that the organization
attempts to instill do not include homosexuality as an acceptable
lifestyle.86 Unlike Roberts, where the Court held that women were allowed
to share the same philosophies as club members, the instant case provides
no evidence to support the proposition that the petitioners previously
allowed avowed homosexuals to share in their values and philosophy. 7
Therefore, to force the petitioners to accept avowed homosexuals as
members would require the petitioners to change their entire organizational philosophy.
In this way, the instant case falls under the exception anticipated in
New York, wherein the Court held that a group may exclude certain
members based on ideological differences. 8 In that case, the Court held
that it is unacceptable to use shorthand measures, such as race or sex, to

its views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its
views receive no First Amendment protection." Id.
80. Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,569-70 (1995);
see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
81. Dale, 120S. Ct. at 2454.

82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984).
84. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.

85. Id. at 2452; see also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
86. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453.
87. Id. In support of this proposition, the Court mentions three policy statements generated
by the petitioners. Id. All threeof these statements (admittedly only one of which was issued before
the respondent's expulsion) express the petitioners' belief that homosexuals are not acceptable as
scout leaders. Id. According to the Court, the existence of these statements indicate that "the official
position of the [petitioners] was that avowed homosexuals were not to be Scout leaders." Id.
88. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
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exclude members.8 9 The instant case, however, does not fall under one of
those specified categories, and inclusion of the respondent would force the
petitioners to express a philosophy with which they do not agree.' The
petitioners' philosophy, which they attempt to instill in young men,.is that
Boy Scouts must have good morals and be clean, both outwardly and
inwardy. 9' It is not for the Court to inquire into whether the petitioners
actually succeed in instilling these values or into whether homosexuality
is necessarily incompatible with this morality.9 2 The success of the
petitioners' undertakings or the value of their message is not at issue.
Regardless of whether the petitioners actually succeed with their teachings,
or whether the majority agrees with them, they have a constitutionally
protected right to maintain a philosophy and, according to the Court's
holding in New York, 93
they have the right to exclude those who do not agree
with that philosophy.
The question, in the instant case, should not revolve around the value
the majority places on the petitioners' message. 94 This criterion is too
vague and arbitrary to be used as the basis for a judicial decision. The
purpose of a court of law is to rule on the law and uphold the rights set
forth in the Constitution. Often, this may mean having to infringe slightly
upon one group's rights in order to protect another's. Nevertheless, it
should not be the Court's role to rule on an organization's message. While
it is not always easy to make the distinction between ruling on a group's
message and upholding a state's interests in eradicating discrimination,
such difficult distinctions are an essential part of every person's
constitutionally-protected freedoms.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.
Id. at 2452.
Id.
New York, 487 U.S. at 13; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2458. The Court concluded its opinion with:
We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the [petitioners']
teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong; public or
judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression does not justify the
State's effort to compel the organization to accept members where such
acceptance would derogate from the organization's expressive message.
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